Physicians' relationships with pharmaceutical industry have recently come under public scrutiny, particularly in the context of prescription opioid drugs. However, to date, no studies have estimated the effect of opioid-related direct-to-physician marketing on opioid prescribing. This study attempts to uncover the causal effect of doctor-industry interactions associated with patented opioids on subsequent prescribing patterns of opioids using linked Medicare Part D and Open Payments data for years [2014][2015][2016]. Results indicate that industry interactions related to patented opioid drugs increase prescribing of patented opioids. Furthermore, I find that promotion of patented opioids increases generic opioid claims, with the largest effect on generic prescribing induced by marketing related to abuse-deterrent formulations (ADFs) of opioids -a result that may be driven by insurance coverage policies for costlier ADF drugs.
Introduction
Nonmedical use of prescription opioids and the resulting overdose deaths have reached unparalleled levels in the United States in the last few years. In 2016, 63,392 individuals died from overdoses, with 66.4% of the cases involving prescription and/or illicit opioids (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018) . The policymakers are attempting to combat the opioid epidemic through various approaches. Because prescribers play a crucial role in appropriate opioid dispensing, some of the policy focus has been on limiting opioid prescriptions. For example, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) recently finalized a number of new policies for 2019 to help Medicare plan sponsors combat prescription opioid overuse and misuse by imposing limits on initial opioid prescriptions fills and identifying high-risk users. Additionally, some physicians and pharmaceutical industry representatives argue that abuse-deterrent formulations (ADFs) -patented opioids with properties that prevent unintended routes of administrations and make misuse more difficult -provide a safer option for treatment of ongoing pain compared to the generic opioid drugs (Webster et al., 2017) . However, while measures are being taken to reduce opioid prescribing, opioid manufacturers are paying doctors large sums of money annually promoting their products in an attempt to induce physicians to prescribe more of their opioid drugs. In an effort to reduce pharmaceutical industry influence on prescribing, a large number of US hospitals and academic medical centers (AMCs) have imposed limits on interactions between physicians and pharmaceutical sales representatives. However, studies looking at the link between direct-to-physician marketing and physician prescribing have uncovered mixed results in terms of the effectiveness of industry payments on increasing prescribing, largely due methodological limitations which do not control for potential biases. Additionally, to date, there are no studies examining the causal effect of direct-to-physician opioid promotion on opioid prescribing.
This study attempts to uncover the causal effect of doctor-industry interactions on subsequent prescribing patterns of opioids. Using longitudinal physician data from Medicare Part D and Open Payments program for years 2014-2016, I examine how direct-to-physician marketing of patented opioid drugs affects physician's patented and generic opioid claims. Because opioid-promoting companies target doctors who already prescribe large quantities of opioids (whether due to patient population characteristics or some unobserved doctor preferences), it is important to account for the high-prescriber selection into marketing relationships with opioid firms. Using physician fixed effects controls for the observed and unobserved doctor characteristics and prescribing preferences which may lead to such selection. Additionally, inclusion of the interacted zip code by year fixed effects accounts for the unobserved geographical demand shocks that vary over time and which may affect both opioid promotion and prescribing.
Preliminary results suggest that physician-industry opioid interactions indeed increase physician prescribing of patented opioid drugs. This increase, however, is not offset by doctors substituting away from the generic opioids, which tend to be more prone to misuse. On the contrary, I find that direct-to-physician promotion of patented opioids also increases generic opioid claims -a result robust to alternative specifications. The largest spillover effect on generic prescribing arises primarily from abuse-deterrent opioid marketing, and may be driven by the insurance company policies restricting costlier ADF drugs.
Background 2.1 Abuse-Deterrent Formulations and Policy
One strategy designed to combat the opioid epidemic is the development of abuse-deterrent formulations (ADFs) of prescription opioids. The main goal of ADFs is to deter an individual from chewing, inhaling, or intravenously injecting the drugs, which give the individual a greater degree of "rewarding" effect but also rapidly elevate the blood pressure and increase the risk of respiratory depression and a fatal overdose. In addition, non-oral routes of administration are associated with an increased risk of addiction and abuse, as well as a variety of other health consequences, including damage to nasal/oral structures and blood-borne infections (Dunn et al., 2010; Raffa and Pergolizzi, 2010; Katz et al., 2011) .
Because opioid medications continue to play a vital role in pain management, ADFs may be a valuable component of providers' opioid risk management plans (along with patient education, prescription drug monitoring programs, and other guidelines/policies).
In order to encourage a shift from the traditional opioid formulations to ADFs, the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) released 43 new or revised product-specific guidance documents to push generic ADF development (U.S. Food and Drug Administration, 2018).
However, ADFs are yet to be implemented as a common prescribing practice, largely because these new formulations are available only as patented products, which are more expensive than a large number of non-abuse-deterrent opioids that are available in generic formulations. Furthermore, many insurance companies will not cover ADFs and/or limit their reimbursement, which deters doctors from prescribing them. For example, Institute for Clinical and Economic Review (ICER) reviewed 2017 coverage policies and formularies for six New England state Medicaid programs, CMS, and 12 major "Silver-level" plans on individual marketplaces across New England, and identified coverage policies for four of the nine (available in 2017) ADF opioids 1 . They found that all plans maintained quantity limits for these opioids and the majority required prior authorization 2 . Several studies have examined the unwillingness of the insurance companies to cover tamper-resistant and ADF opioids, with access limitation that include requirements by the insurance carriers for patients to provide diagnosis of addiction, documentation of high-risk for abuse, and/or exclusions from formularies (Brushwood et al., 2010; Argoff et al., 2011; Schatman and Webster, 2015) . In addition to prior authorization and other requirements, it is common for the commercial insurance plans to mandate that patients try generic equivalents or preferred brand name opioids first (Institute for Clinical and Economic Review, 2018) .
By encouraging utilization of relatively cheaper but abuse-prone (generic) formulations, 1 OxyContin, Xtampza, Hysingla ER, and Embeda are the four ADFs identified.
2 Prior authorization requirement means that the doctor must obtain approval from the insurance plan in order to prescribe the drug.
such "fail first" policies may be undermining the national efforts to curb unsafe opioid prescribing. While not the largest age group misusing opioids, older adults (aged 65+) are exhibiting sharp increases in mortality and hospitalization rates due to prescription opioid misuse (Benson and Aldrich, 2017) . Medicare population has among the highest and fastest-growing opioid use disorder 3 rates, with more than 6 of every 1,000 beneficiaries being diagnosed with opioid addiction (Lembke and Chen, 2016) . Additionally, older adults with opioid use disorder may be at a higher risk of death compared to the younger adults (Larney et al., 2015) . Therefore, understanding how patented opioid marketing influences the types of opioids being prescribed to the elderly may play an important role in informing about patient access to safer (less prone to misuse) ADF medications.
Literature
In 2015, about 48% of physicians have received industry-related payments (Tringale et al., 2017) . Pharmaceutical companies spend more than $20,000 annually per physician on direct-to-physician advertising that may include visits, gifts, samples, meals, travel, consulting fees, and more (Weiss, 2010) . The question of how pharmaceutical marketing efforts aimed at physicians affects the consequent prescribing behavior has received considerable attention in the marketing literature and, to a smaller extent, in the economic literature. Most studies find that the marginal effect of detailing 4 on the market share is much greater than the effect from consumer-directed marketing (Dave, 2013 (Dave, , 2014 Kremer et al., 2008) . However, many studies do not control for the endogeneity that arises when attempting to identify the causal effect of drug advertising to physicians. Very few studies utilize the panel data framework, where physician fixed effects can be used to control for observed and unobserved physician heterogeneity in prescribing preferences. The exceptions are Datta and Dave (2017) and Mizik and Jacobson (2004) , who use monthly longitudinal data to look at the role that detailing and sampling play in affecting prescribing. However, Datta and Dave (2017) look at a very specific class of drugs designed to treat herpes viral infections. Mizik and Jacobson (2004) examine three unknown drugs produced by one, undisclosed, firm. Therefore, the estimated effects in these two studies may only apply to specific drug categories 5 . Both studies find that the effect of directto-physician marketing is quite modest relative to studies not utilizing physician fixed effects, suggesting that most of the observed relationship between promotion and drug sales is driven by the selection bias.
To my knowledge, only three studies have analyzed the relationship between opioidrelated industry interactions with physicians and opioid prescribing (Hadland et al., 2017 (Hadland et al., , 2018 Nguyen et al., 2019) . Using Open Payments database, Hadland et al. (2017) calculate that 375,266 non-research, opioid-related payments to were made to 68,177 US physicians totaling $46,158,388 between 2013 and 2015. They also find that 1 in 12 physicians received an industry payment involving an opioid, with most common types of payments being food and beverage payment, comprising 93.9% of all the payments they examined. In the follow-up study, they link the Open Payments data to Medicare Part D opioid prescribers, to show that the receipt of any non-research payment related to an opioid product in 2014 was associated with 9.3% more opioid claims in 2015 (Hadland et al., 2018) . Nguyen et al. (2019) also uncover positive association between opioid-related promotions and opioid prescribing, finding that prescribers receiving promotional opioid their product. 5 In addition, neither study controls for competitive firms' marketing efforts, including direct-to-physician marketing, which is problematic if firms' detailing activity is correlated.
payments prescribe 8,784 more opioid daily doses per year relative to physicians who did not receive any marketing payments. However, these studies do not account for the endogeneity of opioid-related industry payments to physicians. Since pharmaceutical sales representatives target doctors who are most likely to prescribe their products, such as physicians who are already high-prescribers of opioids and/or physicians who have patient populations with high demand for opioid drugs, not accounting for this selection leads to biased estimates that overstate the effect of opioid marketing to physicians.
This study informs the direct-to-physician marketing literature by examining whether or not industry interactions have a causal effect on prescribing while fully exploiting the longitudinal data approach through the use of physician fixed effects to control for prescribing preferences. The answer to this question may inform, therefore, about the effectiveness of policies that restrict physician access to the pharmaceutical company representatives and, potentially, access to valuable-to-physician drug information that such interactions may provide 6 . As various policy initiatives designed to reduce overall opioid prescribing and increase substitution from generic to ADF opioids have been put forth, the question of how direct-to-physician marketing affects physician's opioid prescriptions and which type of opioids are affected (generic, patented, or ADF) is particularly relevant.
Importantly, examining how direct-to-physician marketing may affect "unsafe" generic prescribing, may provide important insights about possible channels through which pharmaceutical interactions may affect the risks of addiction and mortality from overdoses, as well as provide evidence of problems with insurance access to "safer" opioid drugs.
Data
The data comes from two databases maintained by the US Centers for Medicare and list. Only payments associated with patented opioid drugs were used to study the effect of such payments on physicians' prescribing patterns, because the prescription written for patented drugs cannot be substituted for a generic drug by the pharmacist. Table 1 contains the list of patented opioids used to define a patented industry-physician interaction. If a payment associated with any of the listed opioids was observed, that interaction counted as a patented opioid industry interaction. Table 2 lists all opioid interactions by type observed for the main sample of physicians 7 .
Medicaid Services (CMS). One contains prescription claims written under

Methodology
The following equation is used to estimate the effect of physician-directed marketing interactions on the prescriptions of opioid drugs:
Equation 1 It is crucial to address the selection of physicians into interactions with the pharmaceutical firms. High prescribers of opioids, whether generic or brand-name, or ones with 7 The main sample consists of physicians who had at least one interaction related to patented opioids in 2014-2016. See Table 3 for main sample ("Ever Interacted") summary statistics. 8 Generic opioid claims may include branded drugs, but these branded opioids were not patented at the time of the study. Any branded medications that are not patented can be substituted for the generic by the pharmacist, and in many states, the law requires the pharmacies to do so. higher probability of prescribing opioid medications (for example, physicians in certain specialties or in market areas with higher demand for opioids), are more likely to be targeted by the pharmaceutical company representatives. As Table 3 (Datta and Dave, 2017) . Thus, the estimation strategy relies on within-doctor variation, where physician fixed effects (θ iz ) account for these potentially confounding observed and unobserved time-invariant factors. Additionally, the inclusion of interacted zip code by year dummy variables (λ zt ) controls for zip code specific, time-varying demand shocks that may affect both prescribing and pharmaceutical marketing activity. For example, the interacted fixed effects control for factors such as zip code level changes in prescribing, disease prevalence, area demographics, economic conditions, marketing levels, unobserved seasonal and national trends (such as shifts in Medicare Part D drug coverage that affect all beneficiaries), policies related to opioid prescribing, and pharmaceutical promotion trends aimed at consumers. Thus, the source of my model's identifying variation comes from doctor trends that vary across physicians within the same zip code. Because utilizing within-physician, within-zip code variation allows to control for regional, zip code-specific opioid demand shocks that may vary from year to year, the main threat to this identification strategy comes from physician-specific (non-regional) demand shocks not otherwise accounted for by the control variables.
Prescribing of opioids also depends on the patient population of the physician. Not only are doctors with more elderly, chronic-pain-prone patients expected to write more opioid prescriptions, but they are also more likely to be targets for opioid marketing. Additionally, to examine how interactions related to the promotion of ADF opioids affect claims, I estimate the following equation:
Where, equation (2) Since the central analysis relies on the within-physician, within-zip code variation, the main sample is restricted to physicians who had at least one interaction with the industry involving a patented opioid for years 2014-2016 (the "Ever Interacted" column in Table   3 ), and who are in the sample for more than one year. Physicians who moved from one zip code to another during the period of the study could potentially have unusual prescribing patterns and, thus, were excluded from the sample. Observations with less than two doctors within a zip code year were also excluded from the main sample. Table 4 displays the coefficient estimates for the effect of opioid firm interactions on physician' patented opioid claims. The coefficients across all specifications of the model imply that interactions with the opioid industry have a positive effect on physician's patented claims. Column 1, the specification with all the control variables and no fixed effects, indicates that each interaction involving a patented opioid increases physician's patented opioid claims by about 2.1. Adding zip code, year, and interacted zip code by year fixed effects in columns 2, 3, and 4, respectively, leaves the estimates virtually unchanged. Specification 5, the main specification, fully exploits the panel data of the model and accounts for physician fixed effects, which capture physician's time-stable observed and unobserved characteristics and preferences. When physician fixed effects are added, the average effect from an interaction is reduced, with each interaction inducing the physician to produce 0.7 more patented opioid claims. These results imply that physicians are likely targeted by firms based on physician heterogeneity in observed and unobserved characteristics and preferences, rather than zip code-level geographical heterogeneity. The addition of the quadratic term is not statistically significant, implying that the average effect of interactions on prescribing of patented opioids is relatively linear. Table 5 presents the regression estimates for the average effect of interactions with the opioid industry on doctor's generic opioid claims. The results inform about whether the direct-to-physician marketing of patented opioids has any spillover effects on generic opioid prescribing. All specifications suggest that such spillovers are indeed present, with opioid industry interactions positively affecting physicians' generic (non-patented) opioid claims. Column 1 (specification that does not account for fixed effects) shows that each interaction is associated with an average increase of 12 generic claims per year. When zip code fixed effects, year fixed effects, and interacted zip code by year fixed effects are added to the model (columns 2, 3, and 4 respectively), the coefficient measuring the effect of industry interactions is reduced slightly. The average effect of an interaction is reduced substantially, however, when physician fixed effects are added to the model The results in Table 6 suggest that direct-to-physician marketing involving a mix of ADF and non-ADF patented opioid promotion ("ADF+Patented Interactions") has the biggest effects on both patented and generic claims relative to interactions that involve only-ADF or only non-ADF marketing. However, ADF-only marketing interactions have a greater (in absolute magnitude) effect on generic claims compared to non-ADF interactions, with each ADF-only interaction increasing generic claims by about 6 claims per year and each non-ADF interaction increasing generic claims by about 3 claims per year.
Results
On the other hand, each non-ADF marketing episode increases patented prescribing more than ADF-only promotion -with the former increasing patented opioid claims by 0.7 and the latter by 0.5. Table 7 presents the coefficient estimates of the specification where the dependent variable patented opioid claims is disaggregated into two mutually exclusive categories -ADF (patented) claims and non-ADF (patented) claims. Again, direct-to-doctor promo-tion involving the discussion of both ADF and non-ADF opioid drugs has a greater effect 
Robustness
To further asses the robustness of my results, I estimate equation 1 on several different samples of physicians. Additionally, I employ an instrumental variable strategy on a full sample of physicians (the "All" column in Table 3 ), in case the main specification does not fully account for the endogeneity that may arise when physician-specific opioid demand shock is correlated with pharmaceutical marketing episode. For example, this could occur if a physician experiences a sudden increase in the number of opioid claims (that is unrelated to changes in demand at the zip code level), that induces a visit from a drug company sales representative.
IV Identification Strategy
The instrumental variable model identification strategy is similar to the approach taken by Grennan et al. (2018) , and relies on the fact that drug manufacturers allocate their marketing budget based on certain aggregate market characteristics. For example, markets with many opioid-prescribing providers and larger pain-prone population are more likely to have bigger direct-to-physician marketing budgets allocated to them 10 . The firms' marketing models are based on detailed data that includes physicians' prescribing history, physician and practice characteristics, and past history of physician's interactions with the pharmaceutical firms (Campbell, 2008) . Once the budgets are allocated and pharmaceutical representatives are assigned to their respective regions, it is up to the individual sales reps to target "high-value" physicians. Thus, after conditioning on characteristics that make a given physician likely to be targeted by the sales representative, the characteristics of other physicians in the geographic market (attractiveness of other physicians to the pharmaceutical reps) can serve as instruments for the physician's interactions with the pharmaceutical company, and should not affect the given physician's prescribing directly. Equations 3 and 4 present the first and the second stages of the IV approach.
1st stage:
2nd stage:
I use zip code level variables to serve as instruments for opioid-related interactions with the pharmaceutical firm (Interactions zt(−i) ). The instrument set includes the total number of opioid-related interactions in physician i's zip code (excluding i 's opioid-related interactions) and the total value of payments made to other physicians in i 's zip code by any pharmaceutical or medical device firm. These zip code level instruments should be correlated with physician i 's opioid-related interactions, but should not affect i 's opioid claims directly after controlling for i 's practice and patient characteristics. Instead of using within-physician, within zip code differences to identify the effect of pharmaceutical marketing (my main specification), the advantage of using this strategy is that the source of identifying variation comes from the other physicians within the zip code. This estimation strategy does not allow to employ interacted zip code by year fixed effects, since this is the variation I depend on. However, zip code fixed effects (v z ), year fixed effects (τ t ),
and physician fixed effects (θ iz ) are included separately. Vector X izt contains covariates defined in the main specification. restrictions implies that they are also valid. The coefficient estimate for the effect of interactions on patented claims is 0.702, which is almost identical to the preferred specification in Table 4 (column 5). The average effect on generic claims is 6.837, compared to a slightly lower coefficient estimate of 4.990 from Table 5 (column 5) . Overall, the IV coefficient estimates provide confidence in the results of the preferred, fixed effects specification shown in Tables 4 and 5.
Other Robustness Checks
In order to check whether the results are driven by outliers, I perform the estimation of equation 1 on samples of physicians that exclude extreme values. Since doctors who have very high number of yearly interactions with opioid marketers may be induced the most (or to a greater extent) to prescribe more opioids, Table 10 presents the results for the sample of physicians that excludes highest 1% of opioid interactions. The results appear to be almost identical. The coefficient estimate on patented claims is slightly lower, with each interaction increasing patented claims by 0.6 (compared to 0.7 in the main estimation).
The coefficient estimate on generic claims, however, is slightly higher. It increases from 5 to 7.2. To see if very high payments to doctors (at each marketing interaction) are driving the effect of marketing on opioid claims, Table 11 presents coefficient estimates for the sample that excludes top 1% of promotional payment amounts. Once again, the coefficient estimates are virtually unchanged, with each interaction increasing patented claims by 0.6
and generic claims by 6.7. The coefficient estimates in Tables 10 and 11 suggest that the main specification results are not driven by physicians receiving large opioid payments or by prescribers with unusually high levels of industry interactions. Furthermore , Table   12 estimates show that excluding 1% of highest opioid prescribers does not significantly alter the results, with each interaction increasing patented and generic claims by 0.6 and 3.6, respectively.
Discussion
The results indicate that industry interactions associated with marketing of patented opioids have a statistically significant effect on patented opioid prescribing, with each interaction increasing physician's prescribing by 0.7 patented opioid claims. Since the average doctor in the main sample has 3.41 interactions with opioid firm per year, the estimate implies that, on average, these interactions will increase physician's patented opioid claims by 12.6% per year. This provides suggestive evidence that firm interactions with physicians indeed push them toward prescribing more patented (and possibly costlier) opioid drugs. The estimates are substantially lower than specifications that do not account for endogeneity, suggesting that a good amount of the observed association between directto-physician promotion and opioid sales reflects unobserved selection of physicians into industry relationships.
The results also suggest that the direct-to-physician marketing of patented opioids have substantial spillover effects on generic opioid prescribing. Across all specifications the results indicate that generic opioid claims increase by about 5 claims from each interaction with the opioid industry, implying that doctors in my main sample increase their generic claims by 3.7% per year 11 as a result of pharmaceutical interactions related to patented opioids. Therefore, doctors, instead of switching patients from generic opioids when they learn about the new patented (and, in some cases abuse-deterrent) opioid medications, are instead prescribing more generic (susceptible to abuse) opioid drugs.
The results from Tables 6 and 7 shed more light on these findings. It appears that a substantial portion of the positive spillover effect on generic prescribing stems from the pharmaceutical promotion involving ADF opioid drugs. Recall that these abuse-deterrent opioids are associated with reduced insurance plan coverage and, in many instances, are subject to plan-specific rules that require that the patient try a generic opioid or a cheaper patented version before the ADF is covered. One possible explanation of the results is that doctors who are induced to prescribe relatively-safer drugs by direct-to-physician ADF marketing, must first prescribe more generic opioids, leading to positive spillovers on generic opioid claims. On the other hand, physicians do not face the same insurance constraints when prescribing non-ADF drugs. It is also possible that physicians who are initially induced to prescribe more ADF drugs (as they learn about their safer properties from the sales representatives), end up switching their patients to generics as a result of patents' unwillingness to deal with ADF's high cost and difficulty with access.
It is important to mention that these findings may come with certain caveats. First, the results may be specific to physician-industry interactions in the market for patented opioid drugs and not relevant for other pharmaceuticals. Additionally, the results may not be applicable to all physicians who prescribe opioids, but only to the ones who engage in interactions with the pharmaceutical firms. However, the results carry important implication for the nation-wide policy strategies used in the battle with opioid addiction. The findings suggest that total market demand for opioids (both generic and patented) may be increased by the direct-to-physician marketing of opioids, undermining the current federal and state efforts to reduce opioid prescribing. Importantly, the promotion of "safer"
11 Based on the 3.41 interactions per year average.
abuse-deterrent opioid drugs may come with unintended consequences in the form of wider prescribing of generic, abuse-prone medications. Therefore, FDA's encouragement to pharmaceutical companies urging them to produce and develop more abuse-deterrent opioid drugs must go hand-in-hand with insurance plan removal of "fail-first" requirement, which only induces riskier opioid consumption. 
